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The position of encroachments under the Land Registration Act 2002 are 
unclear. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in relation to Schedule 6 LRA 
2002 – Baxter v Mannion1 and Best v Chief Land Registrar2 - have begun to put 
flesh onto the bones of this aspect of the 2002 Act reforms. It is clear from the 
Law Commission report that changes to the rules on adverse possession were 
a central focus of the reforms,3 designed to encourage reluctant landowners to 
voluntarily register their land where a trigger for compulsory registration was 
unlikely to materialise.4 No longer a matter of limitation and extinction of 
title,5 adverse possession is now managed through a warning system from the 
Land Registry to those at risk of losing title to land.6  
 
In introducing these new rules however, the Law Commission fails to address 
some of the more unusual aspects of (the broad doctrine of) adverse 
possession (even if, as is argued below, strictly speaking encroachments is not 
part of the law of adverse possession), and as a result there is some lack of 
clarity remaining. This article examines the relationship between 
encroachments (the possession of land, belonging to a landlord, outwith the 
original demise by a tenant, and the possession of land belonging to a third 
party consequent on the possession of the demised land) and adverse 
possession. It makes some suggestions as to how this is catered for under the 
schedule 6 procedure. It is argued, firstly, that it appears that the tenant who 
possesses against their landlord is unable to apply to be registered under 
schedule 6, but may be able to apply on the basis of an estoppel or similar, 
treating encroachments as a separate, independent doctrine. In other words, 
this species of encroachment is not part of the adverse possession doctrine. 
Secondly, a landlord of an encroaching tenant also appears on a strict reading 
of the Act to be unable to apply to become registered proprietor of the 
freehold estate, notwithstanding the guidance of HM Adjudicator to the Land 
Registry.7 This species of encroachment does involve adverse possession, but 
the rules are modified so as to account for the impact of the landlord and 
tenant relationship.  
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It is much to be regretted that the HM Adjudicator as was has been reluctant 
to adopt such an approach to date, and it is hoped that guidance from a 
higher court will demonstrate that the statutory language of schedule 6 
struggles to accommodate the doctrine of encroachments. 
 
 
Encroachments 
 
The general term “encroachments” is used to refer to two separate issues. 
Firstly, a tenant can “encroach” upon their landlord’s land. In such 
circumstances, the tenant may be able to add the land possessed to their lease, 
but they will not be entitled to a freehold estate in that land arising through 
their possession.8 This, it is argued, is not an example of adverse possession, 
and is justified through the nature of the landlord and tenant relationship, 
and not through the creation of a possessory freehold title. Secondly, a tenant 
may adversely possess land belonging to a third party. In these circumstances, 
the freehold title will pass not to the tenant, but to the landlord.9 The tenant is 
seen as possessing on behalf of his landlord. This is an example of adverse 
possession, but the consequences of it are again altered by the landlord and 
tenant relationship. The term “encroachments” therefore can be seen as 
generally referring to possession of land without permission where that 
possession is consequent on a landlord and tenant relationship. The operation 
of the two different species of encroachments are however explained in 
different ways, as will be seen below.   
 
Neither of these rules particularly makes sense if they are thought of as being 
adverse possession strictly speaking, not least because in the former case the 
possession can be with the consent of the landlord.10 They are essentially rules 
in and to themselves, relying on possession, but operating differently from 
adverse possession as conceived of under the Limitation Act 1980 (in that in 
neither case is the original proprietor’s title extinguished, leaving only the 
possessory freehold title conferred by adverse possession onto the possessor). 
The decision of the final court of Hong Kong however in Secretary for Justice v 
Chau Ka Chik Tso11 suggests however that the relationship between adverse 
possession and encroachments is a close one, dependent upon issues of 
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relativity of title and extinction,12 and not, as has previously been considered, 
on a doctrine akin to (or possibly indeed of) estoppel.13 The basis and the 
operation of the rules is “tangled”.14 The results of this entanglement in terms 
of the 2002 Act are discussed below. 
  
 
The basis for encroachment rules – tenant encroaches on landlord’s land 
 
In order to fully understand how these two branches of encroachments might 
fit within schedule 6, it is important to attempt to understand what is actually 
occurring, and what, as a result, the conceptual basis of these rules are. As has 
been discussed by Merry,15 the justification for either extending the scope of 
the demise through adverse possession, or conferral of freehold title onto the 
landlord rather than conferring freehold title onto the tenant adverse 
possessor lies possibly in the implied obligations resting on the tenant vis-à-
vis his landlord; or possibly in estoppel; or possibly in a restricted 
understanding of the meaning of extinction in this context; or possibly on 
none of these. Which of these it is matters for how encroachments will operate 
in the context of land registration. 
 
In its simplest terms however, as Merry describes:  
The principle is that if a tenant goes into and remains in land belonging to 
the landlord… outside the boundaries of but adjoining or adjacent to the 
land demised to him, it is to be presumed that the intention of the tenant is 
to annex to the demise the encroached-upon land so as to enable him to 
occupy that land as if it were part of the demise.16 
This understanding finds support in the case law. In Kingsmill v Millard for 
example, Parke B reasons that: “the presumption is, that the tenant has 
inclosed it for the benefit of his landlord, unless he has done some act 
disclaiming the landlord's title”.17 Thus both the fact of possessing, and the 
intention associated with that possessing are relevant. The justification for the 
rule therefore is connected with the absence of an intention to hold on one’s 
own behalf. This in itself would be enough to distinguish the doctrine from 
adverse possession, but there are other explanations for the operation of the 
rules, and as noted, the case law does not commit itself to any one of these.  
                                            
12 Secretary for Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso [2011] 2 HKC 441 (CFA (HK)) and Skipwith v Singh 
HM Adjudicator to the Land Registry REF/2009/0850 at [10]. 
13 See Andrews v Hailes (1853) 2 Ellis and Blackburn 349, Kingsmill v Millard (1855) 11 Ex. 313, 
156 ER 849, Perott v Cohen [1951] 1 KB 705, Ali v Tower Hamlets LBC [1996] EGCS 193 although 
see also Long v Tower Hamlets LBC [1998] Ch 197, 203 which acknowledges that the doctrine is 
not dependent upon any of the traditional features of proprietary estoppel. 
14 per Pennycuick VC, Smirk v Lyndale Development [1974] 3 WLR 91, 94. 
15 M Merry, ‘Adverse possession and the principle of encroachment: Secretary for Justice v 
Chau Ka Chik Tso’ [2012] Conv 333. 
16 M Merry, ‘Adverse possession and the principle of encroachment: Secretary for Justice v 
Chau Ka Chik Tso’ [2012] Conv 333 at 335. 
17 Kingsmill v Millard 156 ER 849, 851. 
 
For example, in Perrott v Cohen, Denning LJ argues that, “[t]he principle 
underlying the cases on encroachment is not perhaps strictly an estoppel, but 
it is akin to it”. 18  In Andrews v Hailes the court went further, with Lord 
Campbell CJ stating that, “I proceed on what the civil law calls exceptio 
personalis, and the common law an estoppel”.19 Again, in Kingsmill v Millard, 
per Parke B: “if the landlord is allowed to remain under the belief that the 
encroachment is part of the farm, the tenant is estopped from denying it, and 
must render it up at the end of the term as a portion of the holding”.20 If 
indeed this were to be a true estoppel, the operation of the principle would be 
out of step with other situations of estoppel given the fact that the landlord 
need never know of the tenant’s possession, such that no representation of 
any type could be said to have been made.21 It is perhaps more accurate then 
to consider this as akin to estoppel, rather than estoppel strictu sensu. 
Certainly this approach receives support from the minority in the recent 
Hong Kong case of Secretary for Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso22 and from Batt v 
Adams. Here Laddie J states that:  
The presumption arises out of the relationship between landlord and 
tenant. It is because of their relationship that title acquired by one is 
treated as being acquired for the other. It arises as a kind of estoppel 
out of the relationship.23  
As noted it is also possible to conclude that these rules are based on the 
implied obligations which rest on the tenant vis-à-vis his landlord. The tenant 
is unable to deny that he holds the encroached land subject to these 
obligations.  
 
Finally, it is important to discuss the possibility that this is adverse possession, 
albeit with slightly different rules, and that limitation of title is what is 
happening here. It cannot be extinction of freehold title, since freehold title 
remains, but as Merry describes, “[w]hat was extinguished therefore was the 
owner's right during the term of years to enjoy the property free from the 
term of years”.24 This approach receives support in the Hong Kong decision 
of Secretary for Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso, but also in the approach of HM 
Adjudicator to the Land Registry in Skipwith v Singh: 
In effect, [council for the applicant’s] doctrine disapplies the Limitation 
Act to a landlord's right to recover his adjoining land from an 
encroaching tenant.  In my view, and with due deference to Mr 
Gallagher’s ingenuity, this is a wholly misconceived argument, which 
has no basis in authority, is manifestly unjust, and would lead to an 
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absurd result… Accordingly, the Applicant's claim must stand or fall 
by the application of the law of adverse possession simpliciter, both 
pre- and post- the 2002 Act.25 
 
Notably, even if the rules are based on limitation, the operation of the rules is 
slightly but importantly different from adverse possession. Most importantly, 
there is no requirement in encroachments against a landlord that the 
possession be adverse. Consent of the landlord is irrelevant.26 Relatedly, the 
principle cannot be one of extinction of title for the very reason that the 
landlord’s title is not extinguished. It cannot simply be that the title is 
extinguished but the tenant is estopped from asserting that extinction since in 
such cases there would be no freehold estate in the land. Nor is it a classical 
estoppel.  
 
Thus, the most likely scenario is that this is an independent doctrine which 
relies on possession, but not on limitation or adverse possession in the strict 
sense. Nor is it a true proprietary estoppel, but something akin to it in the 
nature of a specific rule based on certain presumptions as to intention arising 
from the landlord and tenant relationship. It is therefore, in this author’s 
opinion, best understood as a doctrine separate from adverse possession 
(since it does not operate through the creation of a possessory freehold title 
resulting from possession, and the consequential extinction of the paper 
owner’s title through lack of use). The justification for the rules lies not 
therefore in the justifications given for adverse possession, but in the landlord 
and tenant relationship itself. As will be seen, the conclusion that this is not 
based on limitation has very important consequences for the operation of 
schedule 6.  
 
Encroachments as an independent doctrine and schedule 6 
 
What does this mean in terms of registered land? Before exploring this issue 
in detail, it is necessary first to explain process established by the LRA 2002. 
Section 96 LRA 2002 stipulates that limitation of title, as expressed in the 
Limitation Act 1980, no longer applies to registered land. Instead, the process 
of obtention of title through adverse possession is now regulated by schedule 
6. The process in brief is that, firstly, the adverse possessor, after 10 years in 
adverse possession of the land, is entitled to make an application to the Land 
Registry to be registered as proprietor.  At this point, the Land Registry will 
send a notification of the application not only to the registered title-holder,  
but also to other interested parties, such as a registered chargee.  The title-
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holder then has 65 working days in which to respond to the notice from the 
Land Registry.   
 
They have three options. Firstly, they can consent to the application.  This will 
result in the adverse possessor being registered as proprietor.  Secondly, the 
registered proprietor may serve an objection.  This challenges the factual basis 
for the adverse possessor’s application.  This may be a prudent course of 
action where appropriate if, for example, there is a risk that the applicant 
might fall into one of the categories in schedule 6, paragraph 5. Thirdly, the 
registered proprietor may serve a counter-notice.  The counter-notice will 
have the effect of causing the applicant’s application to be dismissed unless it 
falls under one of the categories in paragraph 5.  If the registered proprietor 
does not respond, the applicant will also succeed in being registered as new 
proprietor.   
 
If the registered proprietor does serve a counter-notice, and none of the 
exceptions in paragraph 5 apply, they then have a two-year period in which 
to commence possession proceedings against the adverse possessor.  If they 
fail to do this, the adverse possessor will be entitled to apply again to be 
registered.  They will then automatically be registered.  Thus, total inaction 
for 12 years may still result in a loss of title, but crucially, there will be a 
warning after 10 years or whenever the application is lodged, that such loss is 
imminent. A degree of further protection is thereby accorded to the registered 
title-holder.  
 
Where this protection falls down is where the application falls into one of the 
categories in schedule 6, paragraph 5. If one of these applies, the adverse 
possessor will be registered as proprietor.  These categories are: (1) if there is 
an equity arising by estoppel;  (2) if the applicant is entitled to be registered 
for some other reason;  and (3) if the boundary exception applies.  The 
boundary exception states that if, for a least 10 years ending on the date of the 
application,  the adverse possessor reasonably believed that they were in 
possession of land belonging to them,  and such land was adjacent to 
property to which they did have title,  then they will be entitled to be 
registered notwithstanding a counter-notice served by the current proprietor.  
 
The central features of this regime therefore are the continuation of the 
previous “substantive” definition of adverse possession  (factual possession 
and intention to possess which is adverse ); notification and opportunity to 
object accorded to the current proprietor in all but the narrowest of 
circumstances; and a two-year grace period post notification in which the 
registered proprietor must act. As we shall see, the rules relating to 
encroachments do not sit comfortably within this framework.  
 
In order to demonstrate this a closer look must be had at section 96 LRA 2002. 
This section states that: 
(1) No period of limitation under section 15 of the Limitation Act 1980 
(c. 58) (time limits in relation to recovery of land) shall run against any 
person, other than a chargee, in relation to an estate in land or 
rentcharge the title to which is registered. 
… 
(3)Accordingly, section 17 of that Act (extinction of title on expiry of 
time limit) does not operate to extinguish the title of any person where, 
by virtue of this section, a period of limitation does not run against him. 
This section, effectively, disapplies section 15 Limitation Act 1980, but 
because of the terms of section 8 Limitation Act 1980, arguably this section 
never applied to encroachments anyway. This means that section 96 has no 
affect on encroachments. Section 97 LRA 2002 directs that “adverse 
possession” be dealt with under Schedule 6. Again, since encroachment does 
not involve adverse possession, this does not apply here either, something 
which is confirmed perhaps by the total lack of mention of encroachments in 
the Law Commission report explaining the LRA 2002.27 Thus, the encroaching 
tenant would simply apply to be registered leasehold proprietor under the 
normal rules, and would be registered accordingly if they could prove 12 
years of possession (as the ten-year possession period under the 2002 Act 
would not apply either, contrary to the approach in Skipwith v Singh28 and 
Dickenson Homes v Longhurst29).  
 
Unfortunately the analysis cannot be as simple as this. Although 
encroachments do not require adverse possession, they may involve 
possession which is adverse. That is, encroachments may involve factual 
possession, with an intention to possess, which is not with the consent of the 
paper title-holder. In such cases, although the doctrine of encroachments 
applies, subject to one qualification, it cannot be said that the tenant is not, as 
a matter of fact, in adverse possession. Thus both section 96 and 97 would 
apply and so the operation of the rules in schedule 6 would depend on the 
distinction between consent of the landlord or not since in the latter case there 
would be possession which was adverse (although whether this means that 
there was adverse possession for the purposes of section 96 and 97 depends 
somewhat on how the presumptions in play in encroachments cases are seen 
as impacting upon the operation of adverse possession strictu sensu, an issue 
which is discussed below). Having such a distinction is not wholly illogical, 
but it does not appear in the traditional rules relating to adverse possession.  
 
The qualification mentioned however relates to the intention to possess. The 
intention to possess, famously, requires an intention to possess in one’s own 
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name and for one’s own benefit.30 The intention in encroachment cases, as is 
made clear in Lewis v Rees by Parke B, is to hold “as part of the lease”. 
It is clearly settled that encroachments made by a tenant are for the 
benefit of his landlord, unless it appears clearly, by some act done at 
the time of the making of the encroachments, that the tenant intended 
the encroachments for his own benefit, and not to hold them as he held 
the farm to which the encroachments were adjacent.31 
This is a subtly, but importantly different intention, from that which is 
present in a true adverse possession situation. There is no intention, in short, 
to hold in one’s own name, but rather, by operation of the presumption, an 
intention to hold in one’s own and one’s landlord’s name. This argument may 
provide a route by which we can again assert that all encroachments, whether 
by consent of the landlord or not, are not based on adverse possession at all.  
 
This argument appears to receive some support from the Land Registry in 
their guidance on adverse possession by tenants.  
As explained above, adverse possession requires "the intention, in 
one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at 
large". There is a legal presumption that a tenant who encroaches onto 
other land does so for the benefit of their landlord. At least on one 
view, this presumption means that there is no adverse possession by a 
tenant and that any application under Schedule 6 to the Act should be 
by the tenant’s landlord. 
… Furthermore, there is another view, which is that the presumption is 
only concerned with who might have acquired title at common law to 
the estate concerned and does not alter the fact that the tenant is in 
adverse possession, and so is irrelevant where the application is one 
under Schedule 6.32 
Thus, following from this analysis, we can once again conclude that 
possession of a tenant against his landlord cannot give rise to an application 
under schedule 6, but may instead allow the tenant to apply to be registered 
as leasehold proprietor on the basis of encroachments as an independent 
doctrine. If this is the case, following the requisite period of possession, the 
tenant would apply for an alteration on the grounds that the register was out 
of date (LRA 2002, sch 4 paragraph 2(1)(b). 
 
Encroachments as limitation and schedule 6 
 
How, if at all, is this analysis affected by the decision in Secretary for Justice v 
Chau Ka Chik Tso33 (a similar approach is taken in Skipwith v Singh34)? As 
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discussed above, this decision of the final court of Hong Kong suggests that, 
contrary to the argument presented here, encroachment is not an independent 
doctrine, but rather is based on a nuanced understanding of limitation of 
action. To recap, as Merry summarises: “What was extinguished… was the 
owner's right during the term of years to enjoy the property free from the 
term of years”.35 And the reason for this extinction, was very clearly the 
tenant’s “adverse possession” of the land with the associated limitation on 
intention:  
the effect of the encroacher's adverse possession is necessarily limited 
by the unrebutted presumption and the effect of a trespasser's 
possession depends upon his intentions, so if the trespasser's intention 
was to take possession in a limited way rather than as full owner, the 
consequences should be limited accordingly.36  
If this is correct, i.e. that encroachment is based on limitation then the above 
argument does not succeed at all and schedule 6 will apply to tenant versus 
landlord situations.   
 
As a matter of authority in English law it is fairly clear that the approach in 
Chau Ka Chik Tso is wrong. No authority proceeds on the basis that 
encroachment against a landlord is based on limitation of title – not 
surprising given that the landlord’s title is not extinguished by the possession 
– and the authority of Long v Tower Hamlets LBC shows that landlord’s 
consent when not expressed to be as a mere licence is irrelevant to the 
operation of the doctrine. Instead, there is strong authority that the doctrine is 
based on something akin to estoppel as highlighted above. It is unlikely that 
an English court would therefore follow the decision of the Hong Kong court, 
notwithstanding the presence of Lord Scott. More importantly however, as 
Merry as convincingly argued, the approach based on limitation does not 
make sense as a matter of policy or logic. He demonstrates that to rely on 
limitation requires, “[a finding of] degrees within the owner's own title”37 
leading to a potentially very great degree of uncertainty.  
 
Nevertheless, in case the prestige of the Hong Kong court did result in a 
reassessment by an English court, we must now assess how encroachments fit 
into schedule 6 where a tenant encroaches on land to which his landlord has 
title, but which is not included in the original demise if the doctrine is indeed 
based on limitation. Thus we turn back to the provisions of the Act.  
 
Assuming that the tenant has been in adverse possession for 10 years, he will 
be entitled to apply to be registered as leasehold proprietor of the estate in 
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question (assuming more than 7 years remain on the lease38). That the tenant 
can be described as having been in adverse possession, and that the normal 
procedure in Schedule 6 applies, receives support from the decision of the 
adjudicator in Skipwith v Singh: 
Accordingly, whether or not the application had been made by the 
Applicant under the pre-2002 regime, or under Schedule 6 to the 2002 
Act, the Applicant would be able to establish either twelve, or ten, 
years’ adverse possession, as the case may be.  If the application had 
been treated as made entirely under the 2002 Act, the outcome would 
be exactly the same.39 
 
In such circumstances, it is likely that the landlord would serve a counter-
notice, forcing the application to be dealt with under paragraph 5. 40  The 
application will therefore be rejected by the Land Registry unless the tenant 
can bring himself under the protection of one of the exceptions in schedule 641 
– (a) he is entitled to be registered for some other reason;42 (b) there is an 
equity arising by estoppel;43 and (c) the boundary exception.44 We can dismiss 
the first one. By definition (a) does not apply. We have however to be more 
tentative with (b). It does not apply if encroachment is based on limitation 
and not on estoppel, but what if it is based upon estoppel and the possession 
is adverse since there is no consent of the landlord, and the argument based 
on intention discussed above proves to be wrong? In such a case you could 
say that there is an equity arising by estoppel – it prevents the tenant from 
asserting freehold title - but also contrary to what might be expected, it allows 
the tenant to assert leasehold title, as the minority reasoning in Secretary for 
Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso demonstrates.45 In such a case the tenant could be 
registered notwithstanding the counter-notice.  
 
More likely however will be success based on the boundary exception. This 
requires that: 
(4) The third condition is that— 
(a) the land to which the application relates is adjacent to land 
belonging to the applicant, 
(b) the exact line of the boundary between the two has not been 
determined under rules under section 60, 
(c) for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on 
the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) 
                                            
38 LRA 2002, Section 27(2)(b). 
39 Skipwith v Singh HM Adjudicator to the Land Registry, REF/2009/0850 [14]. 
40 LRA 2002, schedule 6, paragraph 3(1). 
41 LRA 2002, schedule 6, paragraph 5. 
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reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates 
belonged to him, and 
(d) the estate to which the application relates was registered more than 
one year prior to the date of the application. 
There are two problems that a tenant will face here – meeting condition (a) 
and condition (c), and whether they meet this will depend on what 
“belonging to” is said to mean.46 This inelegant phrase is probably supposed 
to mean “registered proprietor of” and of course the tenant will be registered 
proprietor of the leasehold estate (as by definition here it is longer than 7 
years’ duration). In such a case also it would then be a question of fact47 as to 
whether the belief extended to belief in being proprietor of the encroached-
upon land.  
                                  
In other words, the position is potentially complex, and there are no clear 
answers. However, to summarise, the options are: 
(1) Encroachment, although based on possession, is not based on adverse 
possession. Thus, section 8 excludes the operation of section 15, and so 
section 96 and 97 LRA 2002 do not apply, and as such encroachment 
operates entirely without schedule 6. A tenant would then rely on sch 4, 
para 2(1)(b) to bring the register up to date. 
(2) Encroachment is based on adverse possession albeit a modified version 
and the Limitation Act does apply. Then the tenant could apply under 
schedule 6, and the provisions of that will determine whether the 
application is successful or not. If the landlord were to serve a counter-
notice, the tenant may be able to bring him or herself into the protection of 
the boundary exception, dependant upon the interpretation of “belonging 
to”. 
(3) Encroachment can be based on adverse possession where there is no 
consent of the landlord, in which case the tenant can apply under 
schedule 6. In this case, if the situation is based on a combination of 
estoppel and adverse possession, then he may be able to rely on the equity 
arising by estoppel for the purposes of paragraph 5.  
 
It is suggested that only the first of these makes sense. Encroachment, 
notwithstanding the discussion in Chau Ka Chik Tso48 and the indications in 
Dickinson v Longhurst Homes 49  and Skipwith v Singh, 50  is not based on 
limitation and adverse possession. It is an independent doctrine based 
something akin to estoppel arising from the presumed intentions that come 
                                            
46  Jourdan and Radley Gardner acknowledge that it is unclear from the text whether 
“belonging to” includes a tenant. S Journal and O Radley Gardner, Adverse Possession 
(Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, 2011) at [22:82]. 
47 See IAM Group v Chowdrey [2012] EWCA Civ 505. 
48 Secretary for Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso [2011] 2 HKC 441 (CFA (HK)). 
49 Dickenson v Longhurst Homes, HM Adjudicator to the Land Registry REF/2007/1276. 
50 Skipwith v Singh HM Adjudicator to the Land Registry, REF/2009/0850. 
from a landlord and tenant relationship, and therefore operates outside the 
principles established by schedule 6.  
 
Tenant versus third party 
 
The position of a tenant who encroaches from the leasehold demise onto land 
owned by a third party has always been more controversial than the position 
between landlord and tenant, and as a result is harder to justify. The general 
rule is relatively clear. Where the tenant adversely possess against the third 
party, that third party’s title is extinguished. Any acknowledgement of title by 
the landlord is irrelevant, since the question relates here to limitation of the 
paper title-holder’s title, and the consequences of this extinguishment.51 As 
Fox explains, “the third party's right to recover possession of the 
encroachment is barred by 12 years' continuous dispossession, rather than by 
12 years' continuous possession by either the landlord or the tenant”.52 Thus, 
without question, this type of encroachment is a matter of adverse possession. 
The tenant will then become leaseholder of that land, and his landlord will 
become freehold owner. The encroached land will then become subject to the 
terms of the lease.53 When the lease comes to an end, the landlord reversioner 
will be entitled to go into possession of the encroached land as freeholder.  
 
According to Merry:  
The rationale for the principle is that the tenant will normally have 
been able to occupy the additional land only because he is the tenant of 
the landlord's land… It is also usually more practical to do so since the 
additional land will normally be small and adjoining the leased land 
and will have been enjoyed with it for a long time, often exceeding the 
normal limitation period of 12 years.54  
Notwithstanding the apparent logic in this approach however, as Laddie J 
explains in Batt v Adams, it is still somewhat difficult to justify the position: 
To an outsider, although the presumption may appear sensible and fair 
to the extent that it covers a tenant's encroachment on his own 
landlord's land, it may appear feudal when it applies to land belonging 
to third parties. Why should a tenant who trespasses on a third party's 
land, perhaps distant from the land the subject of his tenancy, acquire 
title which passes to his landlord? What happens if he is a tenant of 
two or more different landlords and the land which the tenant 
adversely possesses is distant to all of them (or abuts them all)? Which 
landlord acquires title by virtue of the presumption or do they all do so, 
                                            
51 Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett [2005] EWCA Civ 923, [2006] 1 P & CR 9, [99]. 
52 D M Fox, ‘Adverse possession and "palm tree" justice’ (2007) 66 CLJ 17-18. 
53 Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett [2005] EWCA Civ 923, [2006] 1 P & CR 9 [85] and C Harpum et 
al, Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property (6th edn, 2000) at para.21–027. 
54 M Merry, ‘Adverse possession and the principle of encroachment: Secretary for Justice v 
Chau Ka Chik Tso’ [2012] Conv 333 at 335. See also Andrews v Hailes (1853) 2 Ellis and 
Blackburn 349, 118 ER 797, Attorney General v Tomline (1877-80) 5 Ch D 766, 15 Ch D 150 and 
Tabor v Godfrey (1895) 64 L J (QB) 245. 
and if so in what proportions?… Furthermore, it might be said that the 
presumption works a hardship on the tenant. For years he exposes 
himself to the risk of being sued for trespass. His landlord is not liable. 
Yet at the end of the day it is the landlord who benefits from the 
acquired title to the stranger's land. He obtains all the benefit and takes 
none of the risk. He acquires title only because the squatter happens to 
be his tenant on another piece of land.55 
 
The basis of this rule is therefore, once again, unclear and once again, the 
precise mechanism matters here because of the statutory language of schedule 
6. It is clear that there is adverse possession in these situations, but it is far 
from clear that the landlord is able to use this adverse possession as a basis 
for an application under schedule 6. Dickenson v Longhurst Homes56 suggests 
that the correct approach will be for the landlord to make the application 
under schedule 6,57 but it is far from clear that this is right according to the 
terms of the statute. Schedule 6, paragraph 1(1) states that: “[a] person may 
apply to the registrar to be registered as the proprietor of a registered estate in 
land if he has been in adverse possession of the estate for the period of ten 
years ending on the date of the application”. In the case of a landlord, he will 
not have been in adverse possession for ten years. The language does not 
happily accommodate the application of the landlord, but nor is it particularly 
suited to the application of the tenant who as a result of the rule of 
encroachments is entitled to apply only for leasehold title and he has not been 
adversely possessing as against a leasehold estate. The only application that 
makes sense on the statutory wording is for the tenant to apply to be 
registered as freehold proprietor of the disputed land. 
 
The lack of clarity that results from this ambiguity is highlighted by Jourdan 
and Radley-Gardner.  
Take this case: a tenant, T, encroaches on neighbouring registered land, 
reasonably believing the encroached land to belong to his landlord, L. 
T holds possession for ten years. T then applies to be registered as 
proprietor of the encroached land, and the application succeeds. T is 
now the registered proprietor of the encroached land. It is not clear if T 
will have to treat the land as subject to the tenancy, and so have to 
return possession of it to L on the expiry of the tenancy. It may be that, 
if T communicates to L his application to be registered, that will be 
sufficient to negative the presumption that otherwise arises that the 
encroached land is added to the demised premises.58 
Indeed, this lack of clarity suggests that encroachments against third party do 
not fit into the 2002 Act framework at all, and since the Act disapplies the 
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limitation period, it is not possible to succeed on the basis of limitation 
outside the provisions of the Act. As a result, it is arguable that the 2002 
provisions put a stop to encroachments against third parties by tenants, and 
instead. Such a conclusion means that a court would either conclude that the 
tenant is not able to apply for title at all (given the presumption that he has 
possessed on behalf of his landlord), or that he can only apply to be freehold 
proprietor. Policy considerations suggest the former is more likely given the 
desire to prevent very small areas of land belonging to the tenant as 
freeholder once the rest of his lease comes to an end.   
 
This is where the discussion in Tower Hamlets v Barrett59  becomes highly 
relevant however.  The conceptual timing and reality of the situation prior to 
the extinction of the lease tells us what process must be followed by tenant 
and landlord in relation to their applications. It is clear from that case that 
although the tenant is the one in adverse possession, that does not entitle 
them to freehold title to the land, and the third party will be affected by that, 
not just the landlord and tenant. The estoppel-type right which arises out of 
the possession and the landlord and tenant relationship has impacts beyond 
the parties to that relationship. On this reasoning, the tenant is unable to 
apply to become registered proprietor of the freehold since he will be 
estopped (or something like being estopped) from making this application. 
However, if we see the LRA 2002 schedule 6 as an autonomous system, 
dependent upon the definition of adverse possession, but not dependent 
upon its rules relating to extinction, then neither the landlord or tenant are 
apply to apply. The landlord cannot apply as he does not meet the definition 
of the Act. The tenant cannot apply as he is prevented from doing so because 
of the landlord and tenant relationship that arises and which can be relied 
upon and impacts upon third parties.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus, it appears that the LRA 2002 does not account for encroachments at all 
against third parties. It is the tenant who is entitled to apply and no one else 
according to the statutory language. He is entitled to apply only for 
registration of the estate against which he has been in adverse possession. In 
this case he will have been in adverse possession against the freehold estate 
but the rules of encroachments will prevent him from so doing. The landlord 
cannot apply either. Furthermore, it appears that the relationship between 
tenant and landlord is regulated entirely without the scope of schedule 6 so 
that the procedures there do not apply when considering encroachment by a 
tenant against his landlord. Instead, the tenant must apply to have the register 
brought up to date. 
 
Unfortunately, we cannot know for sure what the position is with 
encroachments and schedule 6 without a firm commitment from a higher 
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court as to the basis of encroachments. What we can know however is that the 
wording of schedule 6 does not encompass encroachments at all comfortably. 
Thus, if we take the wording of schedule 6 seriously, it may very well be that 
the doctrine of encroachments is not dealt with under the 2002 Act at all. 
 
 
